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Problem Description 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze and compare different ways to 
avoid the Internet traffic eavesdropping by the governments (we have the 
Swedish example with the FRA-Law, but is also extensible to other countries, 
like China). 
It will begin with a general overview of the countries involved, their interception 
laws, the main reasons that motivated these laws and their social implications. 
The further analysis will consist on a description of the technologies involved in 
each option as well as the difficulties to implement them and the technical 
knowledge of the users in order to take profit of them. 
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Abstract 
 
 
As telephone conversations have moved to the Internet, so have those who 
want to listen in. But the technology needed to do so would entail a dangerous 
expansion of the government's surveillance powers. Internet users are watching 
how their privacy is slowly being undermined with justifications of national 
security and anti-terrorist purposes. 
This surveillance is justified or not, users must know what options are available 
to them to protect their privacy. 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze and compare different ways to 
avoid the Internet traffic eavesdropping (carried out both by governments or 
malicious particulars). 
 
The analysis consists on a description of the different protocols and 
technologies involved in each option as well as the difficulties to implement 
them and the technical knowledge of the users in order to take profit of them. 
 
The conclusions state that with nowadays tools achieving a high security level is 
possible, even for non-professionals users. 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
As long as people have been in private conversations, eavesdroppers have 
tried to listen them. When important issues were discussed in parlors, people 
tried to slip in to hear what was being said. When conversations moved to 
telephones, the wires were tapped. And nowadays that so much human activity 
takes place in cyberspace, spies have infiltrated that area as well. 
 
Unlike earlier, physical frontiers, cyberspace is an artificial construct. The rules, 
designs and investments we make in cyberspace will determine the ways 
espionage, privacy and security will interact. This is the reason why nowadays 
there is a clear movement to give intelligence agencies all over the world a 
privileged position, building in the capacity of authorities to intercept cyberspace 
communications. The advantages of this trend for fighting crime and terrorism 
are obvious. 
 
However, there is big controversy now about whether these intelligence 
activities that allow governments to intercept electronic communications are fair 
since they truncate the basic privacy rights of the users. One of the best 
examples of this is the Swedish “FRA-Law”, that authorizes the state to 
warrantlessly wiretap all telephone and Internet traffic that crosses Sweden's 
borders, affecting not only to the Swedish citizens but also all the people in the 
neighbouring countries. 
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Figure 1.1 - Description how the Swedish Defense Radio Authority (FRA) collects and 
processes communication. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Definition 
 
 
Which is the best way to protect our communications? Can we trust the 
companies offering us “secure” communication software clients? It is strictly 
necessary that our interlocutor has the same software? 
In order to answer these questions we will have to analyze the secure protocols 
used on the Internet and how the software clients implement them. 
 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
 
The thesis is basically focused on the analysis of the most common techniques 
used to avoid Internet eavesdropping. The objectives of the study are 
mentioned below: 
 
• Understanding of the main secure protocols used on the Internet. 
• Understanding and avoiding traffic analysis. 
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• Verify the supposed security level of some e-mail servers. 
• Compare different Instant Messaging clients and their protocols. 
• Determine the best security option for end-users. 
 
Above all, it is important to note that we will only focus on the security of the 
data once it is on the Internet, without considering other options such as, for 
example, our computer infected by a virus which obtains sensitive information 
and send it to a third party. 
 
 
1.4 Contribution of Thesis Work 
 
 
The study concludes that with the available tools end users with security 
concerns can protect themselves of being eavesdropped and also from other 
techniques of obtaining information such as traffic analysis in a very easy way. 
 
They only need to choose for their communications the clients (browsers, e-mail 
clients, etc…) that already work over secure protocols like TLS. 
If more security is needed (for instance when using e-mail servers not 
supporting TLS) they can also use some encryption software like PGP, but then 
they need to share or publish their cryptographic keys and the same encryption 
software is needed in both computers.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Interception Laws and Programs 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Say the word privacy aloud, and you can start a lot of passionate discussions. 
One person cares about governmental abuse of power; another blushes about 
his drug use history; a third one complains about how corporations collect 
private data to target their ads or how insurance companies look for personal 
medical records to deny coverage to certain people. Some fear a world of 
increasing commercialization, in which data is used to sort everyone into one or 
another “market segment”, the best to exploit their most intimate whims.  
 
Because of that, a regulation of data interception and retention is needed, but 
these regulations seem to be not enough for the privacy protection. We are 
going now to see the main surveillance programs running in the European 
Union and United States, as well as China, one country “famous” because of 
the violation of the privacy rights. 
 
 
2.2 European Union 
 
 
The European Union Data Retention Directive (12-15-2005) [14] requires 
telecommunication operators to implement mass surveillance of the general 
public through retention of metadata (data providing information about one or 
more other pieces of data) on telecommunications and to keep the collected 
data at the disposal of various governmental bodies for substantially long times. 
Access to this information is not required to be limited to investigation of serious 
crimes, nor is a warrant required for access. 
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The main mass surveillance activities funded by the European Commission, in 
association with industrial partners, are HIDE and INDECT. 
The consortium HIDE (Homeland Security, Biometric Identification & Personal 
Detection Ethics) is devoted to the pro-active surveillance system to detect 
potential abnormal behaviour in crowded spaces, and not related to the topic of 
this thesis. 
But the one referred to telecommunication monitoring, among other activities is 
the INDECT project [17] (Intelligent information system supporting observation, 
searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environment). It 
develops an intelligent urban environment observation system to register and 
exchange operational data for the automatic detection, recognition and 
intelligent processing of all information of abnormal behaviour or violence. The 
main objectives of INDECT project are: 
• Implementation of a distributed computer system that is capable of 
acquisition, storage and effective sharing on demand of the data. 
• Devices used for mobile object tracking. 
• A search engine for fast detection of persons and documents based on 
watermarking technology used for semantic search. 
• Agents assigned to continuous and automatic monitoring of public 
resources such as closed-circuit television, websites, internet forums, net 
newsgroups, file servers, P2P networks and individual computer 
systems. 
 
 
2.3 United States 
 
 
In 1999 two models of mandatory data retention were suggested for the US. 
The first one consisted in saving the IP address assigned to a customer at a 
specific time. In the second model, which is closer to what Europe adopted, 
telephone numbers dialed, contents of Web pages visited, and recipients of e-
mail messages must be retained by the ISP for an unspecified amount of time. 
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Actually the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) [15]  
requires that all U.S. telecommunications companies modify their equipment to 
allow easy wiretapping of telephone, VoIP, and broadband Internet traffic. 
Besides, millions of dollars per year are spent, by agencies such as the 
Information Awareness Office (with the “Total Information Awareness” program, 
later renamed "Terrorism Information Awareness" after a negative public 
reaction), NSA, and the FBI, to develop, implement, and operate systems such 
as Carnivore, ECHELON, and NarusInsight to intercept and analyze the 
immense amount of data that cross the Internet and telephone system every 
day (for more information about these system see [18][19]). 
The FBI also developed the computer programs "Magic Lantern" and CIPAV 
[20][21]
, which can be remotely installed on a computer system, in order to 
monitor a person's computer activity. 
Also the telecom giant AT&T was accused by The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and has an ongoing lawsuit for its assistance of the U.S. 
government in monitoring the communications of millions of American citizens.  
 
 
2.4 China 
 
 
When talking about Internet and China people always think about censorship. It 
is true that censorship is the major problem there, but it is out of the scope of 
this thesis. We will focus, like in the other cases, in the privacy rights. 
 
Privacy rights have been available to Chinese citizens under the Constitution 
and other legal regulations since the 1980's. However, due to the size and 
strength of government, the laws have not been applied to a great extent. The 
legislature is in the process of developing wider privacy rights under a Civil 
Code. These new rights have the potential to shift privacy power towards the 
citizens for the first time since the founding of the Communist Party of China. 
 
The personal dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of China is recognized 
and protected under Article 38 of the Constitution [16]. Further, the freedom and 
privacy of correspondence of citizens of China are protected; however Article 40 
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provides some significant limitations to such rights – where state secrets or a 
criminal investigation is involved, police and other authorities can intercept 
communications if necessary. The expansive concept of “state secret” gives the 
government enough power to review and monitoring communications. 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Source Routing 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
One of the main keys in choosing or developing a tool for avoiding data 
interception is the difference between the software the sender and the receiver 
of this data have. We can not assume, for instance, that if the sender is using 
some kind of encryption software, the receiver is using the same. 
This was the basis of the idea that only the sender should control de security of 
the transmission, regardless the receiver’s equipment.  
Instead of encrypting the communication, the only thing we had to do was 
routing the packets avoiding the points of interception, in other words, do not let 
the data cross the borders of the neighbouring country who is eavesdropping the 
Internet traffic, and source routing appeared to be the solution to that. 
In the next two sections we will first describe the basics of source routing and 
then comment some security problems that should be taken into account since 
they are key in the evaluation of this mechanism. 
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3.2 Description 
 
 
Source Routing is a technique whereby the sender of a packet can specify the 
route that this packet should take through the network. 
 
The path information is placed in the packet. When the packet arrives at a 
switching device, no forwarding decision is necessary. The router looks at the 
path information in the packet to determine the port on which it should forward 
the packet. This is the opposite of hop-by-hop IP routing, where packets contain 
only the destination address and routers at each intersection in the network 
determine the best path to forward the packet. 
 
Source routing assumes that the sender knows about the topology of the 
network, and hence can specify a path. However, it is not always possible to 
expect end-user or end-user’s systems to know or learn a network's topology. 
This gets more difficult as the network grow, and is nearly impossible on the 
Internet where different provider networks are joined together. From a security 
point of view, as we will see in the next section, it is unwise to allow the sender 
to control the path of packets through the network. 
 
There are two main types of source routing: Strict Source Record Route 
(SSRR) and Loose Source Record Route (LSRR). In strict source routing, the 
sender specifies the exact route the packet must take, whereas in LSRR the 
sender just gives one or more hops that the packet must go through. 
 
For a more carefully description, we should take a look into the IP header (Fig. 
2.1). The Options provided for control functions are necessary or useful in some 
situations but unnecessary for the most common communications. These 
options include provisions for timestamps, security, and special routing. 
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The options may appear or not in datagrams.  They must be implemented by all 
IP modules (host and gateways).  What is optional is their transmission in any 
particular datagram, not their implementation [1]. 
 
The option field is variable in length.  There may be zero or more options.  There 
are two cases for the format of an option: 
 
• Case 1:  A single octet of option-type. 
 
• Case 2:  An option-type octet, an option-length octet, and the actual 
option-data octets. 
 
The option-type octet is viewed as having 3 fields: 1 bit copied flag, 2 bits option 
class, 5 bits option number. 
 
For source routing, the following internet options are defined: 
 
 
CLASS NUMBER LENGTH DESCRIPTION 
 
0 3 Var. Loose Source Routing.  Used to route the                       
internet datagram based on information                          
supplied by the source 
0 9 Var. Strict Source Routing.  Used to route the                          
internet datagram based on information                      
supplied by the source. 
 
       
        
 
 
Figure 3.1 – IP Datagram Diagram 
Table 3.1 – Source routing options. 
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Both LSRR and SSRR options provide a means for the source of an Internet 
datagram to supply routing information to be used by the gateways in forwarding 
the datagram to the destination, and to record the route information. 
 
The options begin with the option type code. The second octet is the option 
length which includes the option type code and the length octet, the pointer 
octet, and length-3 octets of route data. The third octet is the pointer into the 
route data indicating the octet which begins the next source address to be 
processed. The pointer is relative to this option, and the smallest legal value for 
the pointer is 4. 
 
A route data is composed of a series of internet addresses. Each internet 
address is 32 bits or 4 octets. If the pointer is greater than the length, the source 
route is empty (and the recorded route full) and the routing is to be based on the 
destination address field. 
 
If the address in destination address field has been reached and the pointer is 
not greater than the length, the next address in the source route replaces the 
address in the destination address field, and the recorded route address 
replaces the source address just used, and pointer is increased by four. 
 
The recorded route address is the internet module's own internet address as 
known in the environment into which this datagram is being forwarded. 
 
This procedure of replacing the source route with the recorded route (though it is 
in the reverse of the order it must be in to be used as a source route) means the 
option (and the IP header as a whole) remains a constant length as the 
datagram progresses through the internet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3  Source Routing 
- 19 - 
3.3 Security Drawbacks 
 
 
Source routing is a legitimate activity in some cases. For example, it can be 
used to discover the IP addresses of routers within a network. However, it also 
has the potential for misuse. 
A malicious user could use source routing to learn more about a network that he 
or she is targeting for attack. Data packets contain information about where they 
have been and what machines they have transited. A malicious user might send 
data into a network in order to collect information about the network's topology. If 
he or she can perform source routing, they can probe the network more 
effectively by forcing packets into specific parts of the network.  
 
 
3.3.1 IP Spoofing 
 
 
Source routing also enables certain types of attacks. For instance, suppose an 
attacker is unable to attack “A” because it has a well-configured firewall, but 
learns that “B”, which has no firewall, is allowed to directly connect to “A” behind 
its firewall. Source routing would allow the attacker to direct packets to “A” via 
“B”, avoiding the firewall. 
 
Another target of the attacker can be machines on private internet addresses 
such as 192.168.0.1. They are not normally accessible from the internet. If there 
is a machine on a private network that performs routing and traffic may be 
routed through it between two other networks, it may be possible for the attacker 
to specify their data to go through the machine on the private network. He may 
also fool the machine on the private network into believing it is some other 
computer using IP spoofing.  
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3.3.2 DoS Attack 
 
Besides spoofing source addresses for false authentication, attackers can also 
spoof their own source addresses in attacks where reply packets are not 
important. Any network-based Denial of Service (DoS) attack fits this description 
because the point of the attack is not to get a response but instead to flood the 
target with requests [2]. 
In DoS attacks, it actually makes more sense for the attacker to spoof the 
source address, otherwise the attacker might wind up blocking his or her own 
access to the network. Spoofing source addresses also makes tracking the 
attack much more difficult, as the packets themselves must be traced on each 
network and subnet, back to the source. 
Source address spoofing requires root access on UNIX systems. The attacker 
must have root access so that the attack software can open a "raw" network 
socket. Most applications use "cooked" sockets, in which the IP stack provides 
the necessary packet headers. A raw socket means that the application must 
prepare the necessary headers itself—that is, do its own cooking. This permits 
the attacker to put any information he or she wants in the headers, including 
spoofed source addresses. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
 
A little experiment was done. The first part consisted in tracing the route a 
packet follows to a destination (in this case www.google.com): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Later, using whois we can determine whether a router belongs to a country or 
not:  
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Traceroute www.google.com 
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Then all we had to do was source routing the packet avoiding this router (or 
anyone suspicious to be in a country who is wiretapping the communications), 
but what was found out was that due to the security problems listed in the above 
section, it was highly recommended to the ISPs to disable the source routing 
option in their routers, and so they did [3]. 
Even if we have a look on the traceroute command option to do the source 
routing (traceroute –g) we find: 
 
-g gateway  
Tells traceroute to add an IP source routing option to the outgoing packet 
that tells the network to route the packet through the specified gateway. 
Not very useful, because most routers have disabled source routing for 
security reasons.  
 
Because of that we had to discard the source routing as a feasible way to avoid 
the eavesdropping. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Whois 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Secure Protocols 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
In cryptography, encryption is the process of transforming information (referred 
to as plaintext) using an algorithm to make it unreadable to anyone except those 
possessing special knowledge, usually referred to as a key. The result of the 
process is encrypted information. In many contexts, the word encryption also 
implicitly refers to the reverse process, decryption (e.g. “software for encryption” 
can typically also perform decryption), to make the encrypted information 
readable.  
 
 
4.1.1 Public Key Cryptography Overview 
 
 
Since the topic of this thesis is the security over the Internet, and in order to 
understand how the protocols involved on it work, we should first describe the 
basics of the cryptography used by these protocols, the public key cryptography. 
 
The difference between public or asymmetric key and symmetric key 
cryptography is the use of asymmetric key algorithms, where the key used to 
encrypt a message is not the same as the key used to decrypt it. Each user has 
a pair of cryptographic keys, a public key and a private key. The private key is 
kept secret, while the public is distributed. Messages are encrypted with the 
recipient's public key and can only be decrypted with the corresponding private 
key. The keys are related mathematically [24], but the private key cannot be 
derived from the public key. 
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The two main parts of public key cryptography are: 
• Public key encryption: A message encrypted with the recipient's public 
key cannot be decrypted by anyone except the possessor of the matching 
private key (this will be the owner of that key and the person associated 
with the public key used). This is used for confidentiality. 
• Digital signatures: A message signed with the sender's private key can 
be verified by anyone who has access to the sender's public key, proving 
that the sender had access to the private key (and therefore he has to be 
the person associated with the public key used). 
A central problem for use of public-key cryptography is the need of being sure 
that a public key is correct, that it belongs to the person or entity claimed, and 
has not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third party. The usual 
approach to this problem is to use a public key infrastructure (PKI), in which one 
or more third parties, known as certificate authorities, certify ownership of key 
pairs. Another approach, used by PGP, is the "web of trust" method to ensure 
authenticity of key pairs, in which identity certificates can be digitally signed by 
other users who, by that act, endorse the association of that public key with the 
person or entity listed in the certificate. 
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4.2 Transport Security Layer (TLS) 
 
 
4.2.1 Description 
 
 
TLS is an IETF standards protocol, last updated in RFC 5246, that was based 
on the earlier SSL specifications developed by Netscape Corporation. 
The primary goal of the TLS Protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity 
between two communicating applications [4]. It is in widespread use in 
applications like web browsing, electronic mail, Internet faxing, instant 
messaging and voice over IP (VoIP). 
The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS 
Handshake Protocol. 
The TLS Record Protocol is at the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable 
transport protocol and provides connection security that has two basic 
properties: 
 
• The connection is private. Symmetric cryptography is used for data 
encryption. The keys for this symmetric encryption are generated 
uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated by 
another protocol (such as the TLS Handshake Protocol).  The Record 
Protocol can also be used without encryption. 
 
• The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message 
integrity check using a keyed MAC (Message Authentication Code).  
Secure hash functions (like SHA-1) are used for MAC computations.  The 
Record Protocol can operate without a MAC, but is generally only used in 
this mode while another protocol is using the Record Protocol as a 
transport for negotiating security parameters. 
 
The TLS Handshake Protocol is encapsulated by the TLS Record Protocol and 
allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an 
encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before the application protocol 
Chapter 4  Secure Transport Protocols 
- 26 - 
transmits or receives its first byte of   data.  The TLS Handshake Protocol 
provides connection security that has three basic properties: 
 
• The peer's identity can be authenticated using asymmetric cryptography 
(like RSA). This authentication can be made optional, but is generally 
required for at least one of the peers. 
 
• The negotiation of a shared secret is secure: the negotiated secret is 
unavailable to eavesdroppers, and for any authenticated connection the 
secret cannot be obtained, even by a man in the middle attacker. 
 
• The negotiation is reliable: no attacker can modify the negotiation 
communication without being detected by the parties to the 
communication. 
 
A TLS client and server negotiate a stateful connection by using a handshaking 
procedure. During this handshake, the client and server agree on various 
parameters used to establish the connection's security. 
• The handshake begins when a client connects to a TLS-enabled server 
requesting a secure connection, and presents a list of supported Cipher 
Suites (ciphers and hash functions). 
• Then, the server picks the strongest cipher and hash function that it also 
supports and notifies the decision to the client. 
• The server sends back its identification in the form of a digital certificate 
(typically in the form of X.509 certificates, which define required fields and 
data formats). The certificate usually contains the server name, the 
trusted certificate authority (CA), and the server's public encryption key. 
• The client may contact the trusted CA and confirm that the certificate is 
authentic before proceeding. 
• In order to generate the session keys used for the secure connection, the 
client encrypts a random number with the server's public key and sends 
the result to the server. Only the server should be able to decrypt it (with 
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its private key). This is the one fact that makes the keys hidden from third 
parties, since only the server and the client have access to this data.  
• From the random number, both parties generate key material for 
encryption and decryption. 
This concludes the handshake and begins the secured connection, which is 
encrypted and decrypted with the key material until the connection closes. 
If any one of the above steps fails, the TLS handshake fails, and the connection 
is not created. 
 
 
4.2.2 Advantages 
 
 
When implementing security with TLS you place on top of the TCP/IP layers and 
substitute TCP calls with the TLS calls. It is independent of the applications once 
you have set up a connection, after the initiating handshake, it acts just like a 
secure tunnel and you can send anything through it. 
 
A big advantage of TLS is that you don’t need special software on the clients. 
That’s because the TLS uses, for instance, the Web browser as the client 
application. This also means the protocols that can be handled by TLS are more 
limited. However, this can also be a security advantage. With TLS, instead of 
giving clients access to the whole network or subnet as with IPSec (we will talk 
about IPsec later), you can restrict them to specific applications. 
 
There exist several implementation packages, both commercial and free. 
Implementation packages are available for several platforms as Linux, Windows 
and others. That means that many people and companies have done 
implementation of TLS. Many products as web servers (Apache) and browsers 
(Firefox, Internet Explorer …) have support for TLS. That has lead to more and 
more people using TLS. 
 
TLS has all available security functions we want to have to make the project 
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secure: authentication, session key exchange with asymmetric methods, 
encryption with symmetric methods, MAC, and certificates. 
 
 
4.2.3 Drawbacks 
 
 
TLS is placed just on top of the TCP/IP layers, you substitute the TCP calls with 
the TLS calls and that means that the programmer of the implementation has to 
know a lot about the OS and its specific system calls.   
 
Another significant drawback when implementing TLS is that cryptography, 
specifically public key operations, are CPU intensive. As a result, there is a 
performance penalty when using TLS. The penalty varies widely depending on 
how often connections are established and how long they last. The greatest 
overhead occurs while connections are being set up. 
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4.3 Secure Shell (SSH) 
 
 
4.3.1 Description 
 
 
Secure Shell (SSH) is a network protocol that allows data to be exchanged 
using a secure channel between two computers. The two major versions of the 
protocol are referred to as SSH1 and SSH2. SSH was designed as a 
replacement for Telnet and other insecure remote shells, which send 
information, including passwords, in plaintext, leaving them susceptible to 
packet analysis. The encryption used by SSH goal is to provide confidentiality 
and integrity of data over an insecure network, such as the Internet. 
SSH uses public key cryptography to authenticate the remote computer and 
allow the remote computer to authenticate the user, if necessary. 
It is typically used to log into a remote machine and execute commands, but it 
also supports tunneling, mapping TCP ports and X (network protocol that 
provides a graphical user interface) connections; it can transfer files using the 
associated SFTP or the earlier SCP protocols. 
It can be used for many applications across many platforms. Some of them are: 
• Login to a shell on a remote host (replacing Telnet). 
• Secure file transfer. 
• Executing a single command on a remote host (replacing rsh, a 
command line computer program that can execute shell commands as 
another user). 
• In combination with rsync (software application for Unix systems which 
synchronizes files and directories from one location to another) to 
backup, copy and mirror files efficiently and securely. 
• Forwarding or tunnelling a port (permitting access on the private LAN 
from the Internet). 
• Using as a full-fledged encrypted VPN. Note that only OpenSSH server 
and client supports this feature. 
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• Forwarding X from a remote host (possible through multiple intermediate 
hosts). 
• Browsing the web through an encrypted proxy connection with SSH 
clients that support SOCKS (a protocol that facilitates the routing of 
network packets between client–server applications via a proxy server). 
• Securely mounting a directory on a remote server as a filesystem on a 
local computer using SSHFS (The client interacts with the remote file 
system via SFTP). 
• For automated remote monitoring and management of servers through 
one or more of the mechanisms as discussed above. 
 
The SSH protocol consists of three major components: the Transport Layer 
Protocol, which provides server authentication, confidentiality, and integrity with 
perfect forward secrecy, the User Authentication Protocol, which 
authenticates the client to the server, and finally, the Connection Protocol, 
which multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels [4]. 
 
 
4.3.2 Advantages 
 
 
SSH never sends password in clear text. It provides encryption of TCP/IP 
streams from host to host and it also provides protection against DNS/IP 
spoofing attacks, where a machine inside a network of trusted hosts is made 
believe that an outside machine is an inside one.  
 
 
4.3.3 Drawbacks 
 
 
The main SSH security drawback consist in that it does not support certificates, 
digital signatures or MAC. 
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4.4 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
 
 
4.4.1 Description 
 
 
Internet Protocol security (IPsec) is a set of open standards for protecting 
communications over IP networks using cryptographic security services. IPsec 
supports network-level client-server authentication, data origin authentication, 
data integrity, data confidentiality (encryption), and replay protection. 
 
IPsec is operating between the Internet and Transport layers of the Internet 
Protocol Suite. Some other Internet security systems in widespread use (such 
as the two described above) operate in the upper layers. Hence, IPsec can be 
used for protecting any application traffic across the Internet. Applications don't 
need to be specifically designed to use IPsec. The use of TLS, on the other 
hand, must typically be incorporated into the design of applications. 
 
It supports two encryption modes: Transport and Tunnel. Transport mode 
encrypts only the data portion (payload) of each packet, but leaves the header 
untouched. The more secure Tunnel mode encrypts both the header and the 
payload. 
 
Three main protocols are used [6]: 
 
A security association protocol (SA) is set up by another protocol known as 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (which allows the receiver to obtain a public key 
and authenticate the sender using digital certificates) by handling negotiation of 
protocols and algorithms and to generate the encryption and authentication keys 
to be used by IPsec. 
 
An Authentication Header protocol (AH) to provide connectionless integrity and 
data origin authentication for IP datagrams and to provide protection against 
replay attacks. 
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And finally, an Encapsulating Security Payload protocol (ESP) to provide 
confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay 
service (a form of partial sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow 
confidentiality. 
 
4.4.2 Advantages 
 
IP sec is universally applicable as it can protect a mixture of applications 
protocols running over a complex combination of data. It can provide security 
and communicate with different types of networks from all over the world. 
 
IPSec is not limited to specific applications but is application independent. 
Whatever be the application the data will traverse the network, it will be routed 
by IP making it IPSec compatible. 
 
 
4.4.3 Drawbacks 
 
IPSec is complex. It has a great many features and options. Choosing and 
setting an option is a bit difficult. Complexity also increases the probability of 
weaknesses being discovered.  
Firewalls are preconfigured rules and IPSec encrypts these rules in the packet 
which defeats the purpose of a firewall. A solution for this could be firewall along 
with an IPSec gateway.  
The security of IPSec is easily affected by weakness or vulnerability's in the 
specific methods for key exchange, in hashing or encryption algorithms. The 
DES encryption algorithm is now susceptible to brute-force attacks using readily 
available software and hardware. Brute force attacks are methods to decrypt 
data by simply trying every possible key value.  
An IPSec gateway system needs to be secure if this is compromised then no 
system can be trusted if the underlying machine has been subverted. 
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IPSec can't provide the same end-end security as it is not working between 
users or applications but between machines. 
Finally, encryption of small packets generates a large overhead. This diminishes 
network performance. It also requires that the client computers have client 
software installed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  Secure Transport Protocols 
- 34 - 
4.5 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
 
We are going to see now one of the main applications of IPsec: Implementing a 
virtual private network. 
A virtual private network (VPN) is a network that uses a public 
telecommunication infrastructure, such as the Internet, to provide remote offices 
or individual users with secure access to their organization's network. It aims to 
avoid an expensive system of owned or rented lines that can be used by only 
one organization. It provides the organization with the same secure capabilities 
but at a much lower cost. 
It encapsulates data transfers between two or more networked devices not on 
the same private network so as to keep the transferred data private from other 
devices on one or more intervening local or wide area networks.  
VPNs use cryptographic tunneling protocols to provide confidentiality, 
authentication and message integrity. The standard protocol is IPsec, but others 
as TLS, SSH, DTLS (Datagram TLS), MPPE (Microsoft Point-to-Point 
Encryption) or SSTP (Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol) can also be used. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 - Protecting a VPN with IPsec by Using Tunnels in Tunnel Mode 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Traffic Analysis. Anonymity 
 
5.1 Introduction 
People normally think that if they use some of the protocols described in the 
previous chapter or some other encryption software their communication will be 
safe. This is not true, encryption provides a reliable way to avoid the “message” 
eavesdropping, but there is another way to find out a lot of information about the 
sender, this is called traffic analysis. 
Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining messages in order 
to obtain information from patterns in communication. It can be performed even 
when the messages are encrypted and cannot be decrypted. That's because it 
focuses on the header, which discloses source, destination, size, timing, and so 
on. In general, the greater the number of messages observed, or even 
intercepted and stored, the more can be inferred from the traffic.  
It can be used to infer who is talking to whom over a public network. Knowing 
the source and destination of your Internet traffic allows others to track your 
behaviour and interests. This can impact your checkbook if, for instance, an e-
commerce site uses price discrimination based on your country or institution of 
origin. It can even threaten your job and physical safety by revealing who and 
where you are. For example, if you're travelling abroad and you connect to your 
employer's computers to read or send mail, you can inadvertently reveal your 
national origin and professional affiliation to anyone observing the network. 
A basic problem for the privacy is that the recipient of your communications can 
see that you sent it by looking at headers. So can authorized intermediaries like 
Internet service providers, and sometimes unauthorized intermediaries as well. 
A very simple form of traffic analysis might involve sitting somewhere between 
sender and recipient on the network, looking at headers. 
In the next section we will introduce a technique used to avoid traffic analysis: 
Onion Routing. 
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5.2 Onion Routing 
 
 
5.2.1 Description 
 
Onion routing is a technique for anonymous communication over a computer 
network. It protects against traffic analysis.  
In Onion Routing, messages are repeatedly encrypted and then sent through 
several network nodes called onion routers. Each onion router removes a layer 
of encryption to see the routing instructions, and sends the message to the next 
router where this is repeated, and route again the messages in an unpredictable 
path. This prevents the intermediary nodes from knowing the origin, destination, 
and contents of the message. 
 
To create an onion, the router at the beginning of the transmission randomly 
selects a number of onion routers and generates a message for each one, 
providing it with symmetric keys for decrypting messages, and instructing it 
which router will be next in the path. Each of these messages, and the 
messages intended for subsequent routers, are encrypted with the 
corresponding router's public key. This provides the layered structure, in which it 
is necessary to decrypt all outer layers of the onion in order to reach an inner 
layer. 
 
 
Once the path has been specified, it remains active to transmit data for some 
period of time. While the path is active, the sender can transmit equal-length 
messages encrypted with the symmetric keys specified in the onion, and they 
will be delivered along the path. As the message leaves each router, it peels off 
Figure 5.1 – Onion Layered Structure 
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a layer using the router's symmetric key, and thus is not recognizable as the 
same message. The last router peels off the last layer and sends the message 
to the intended recipient. 
5.2.2 Weaknesses 
 
Onion routing does not provide perfect sender or receiver anonymity against all 
possible eavesdroppers: it is possible for a local eavesdropper to observe that 
an individual has sent or received a message. It does provide for a strong 
degree of unlinkability (the notion that an eavesdropper cannot easily determine 
both the sender and receiver of a given message). Even within these limits, 
onion routing does not provide any absolute guarantee of privacy; in general, the 
degree of privacy achieved is a function of the number of participating routers 
versus the number of compromised or malicious routers. 
Moreover, onion routing exit nodes give the operator complete access to the 
content being transmitted (via sniffing) and therefore the onion network should 
not be used to transmit sensitive information without using end-to-end 
cryptography, such as TLS.  
 
5.2.3 TOR 
Tor is a free software 
implementation of onion routing. 
As we have seen in the previous 
section, and now we illustrate with 
some figures, to create a private 
network path with Tor, the user's 
client incrementally builds a circuit 
of encrypted connections through 
the routers on the network. The 
circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each router along the way knows only 
which router gave it data and which router it is giving data to. No individual 
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router ever knows the complete 
path that a data packet has taken. 
The client negotiates a separate set 
of encryption keys for each hop 
along the circuit to ensure that each 
hop can't trace these connections 
as they pass through. 
Once a circuit has been 
established, many kinds of data can 
be exchanged and several different 
software applications can be 
deployed over the Tor network. 
Because each router sees no more 
than one hop in the circuit, neither 
an eavesdropper nor a 
compromised router can use traffic 
analysis to link the connection's 
source and destination.  
 
For efficiency, the Tor software uses the same circuit for connections that 
happen within the same ten minutes or so. Later requests are given a new 
circuit, to keep people from linking your earlier actions to the new ones.  
Figure 5.2 – TOR Operation 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Surfing the Web 
 
 
6.1 HTTPS Description 
 
 
One of the most used protocols when securing the web browsing is HTTPS 
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure). 
 
HTTP was originally used in the clear on the Internet. However, increased use of 
HTTP for sensitive applications has required security measures. SSL, and its 
successor TLS were designed to provide channel-oriented security. 
 
HTTPS is a combination of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol with the TLS 
protocol to provide encryption and secure identification of the server [8]. HTTPS 
connections are often used for payment transactions on the World Wide Web 
and for sensitive transactions in corporate information systems. 
 
HTTP operates at the highest layer of the OSI Model, the Application layer; but, 
as we have seen before, the security protocol operates at a lower sublayer, 
encrypting an HTTP message prior to transmission and decrypting a message 
upon arrival.  
 
The HTTP client should also act as the TLS client. It should initiate a connection 
to the server on the appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin 
the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished, the client may then 
initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data must be sent as TLS application 
data.  
 
The first data that an HTTP server expects to receive from the client is the 
Request-Line production. The first data that a TLS server (and hence an 
HTTP/TLS server) expects to receive is the ClientHello. Consequently, a 
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common practice has been to run HTTP/TLS over a separate port in order to 
distinguish which protocol is being used.   When HTTP/TLS is being run over a 
TCP/IP connection, the default port is 443. This does not exclude HTTP/TLS 
from being run over another transport, and TLS only presumes a reliable 
connection-oriented data stream [8]. 
 
 
6.2 TLS Chiper Suite Negotiation Analysis 
 
When your browser connects to a web site protected by transport layer security 
of some kind (usually by accessing an https:// URL) there is a negotiation 
between the two parties. Each party (browser, server) comes to the negotiation 
with a list of cipher suites that it is prepared to use, and the result is that one of 
these suites is chosen for the connection. 
Nowadays almost every browser support TLS, and we are going to see how the 
chiper suite negotiation is done. Specially, we are going to see it in Mozilla 
Firefox 3.6.8 when browsing the Google encrypted version web site 
(https://www.google.com or https://encrypted.google.com). 
It is hard to figure out which cipher suites Firefox is prepared to use from its 
documentation [22], so we decided to determine the answer directly by looking on 
the negotiation part of the protocol. 
The easiest way we could find to look into a TLS connection is to use the 
Wireshark protocol analyser running on the client machine. All we need to do is 
start up Wireshark and tell it to capture packets going to or from the appropriate 
port at the server's IP address. 
In Fig. 6.1 we can see the Client Hello part of the Handshake protocol sending 
to the server all the possible chiper suites the browser implements (the one in 
blue is the one the server will choose, as we will see in the next capture): 
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In the next figure we see the sever reply with the chosen chipher suite: 
 
Figure 6.1 – Client Hello 
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Finally, once the handshake is finished and the communication has started, we 
can see how the application data is encrypted: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Server Hello 
Figure 6.3 – Encrypted Application Data 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
E-mail 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
With the growth of the Internet in the last 10 years, e-mail has suffered a change 
on his use. It is no longer an internal messaging tool for companies, it has 
spread everywhere. 
 
Probably e-mail eavesdropping is the biggest concern among the users. Every 
day millions of mails with private data are sent. So it is very important to secure 
them, however many of the users don’t know most of their e-mail providers are 
not implementing any security measures at all. 
 
Most Internet-based e-mail systems use a combination of three main protocols: 
SMTP (for message delivery) and POP and IMAP (for message retrieval). Of 
course, for proprietary systems, there are other, different, protocols that take the 
place of these standardized ones. Nevertheless, when it comes to pulling and 
pushing e-mail across the Internet, these three are the dominant ones. 
At the ISP level, a level of protection can be implemented by encrypting the 
communication between servers themselves, usually employing TLS. In section 
7.4 we will analyse how SMTP over TLS works. Also POP and IMAP connection 
can be secured with TLS. 
 
Although many ISPs have implemented secure sending methods, users have 
been slow to adopt the habit, sometimes due to the esoteric nature of the 
encryption process. Without user participation, e-mail is only protected 
intermittently from intrusion. 
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To provide a reasonable level of privacy, all routers in the e-mail pathway, and 
all connections between them, must be secured. This is done by data 
encryption. 
An industry-wide push toward regular encryption of e-mail correspondence is 
slow in the making. However, there are certain standards that are already in 
place which some services have begun to employ. In the next two following 
sections we are going to describe two standards that provide that encryption: 
PGP and S/MIME. 
 
Finally, as a curiosity, we also can find some other methods to secure our e-
mail. Even maybe they are not very practical or secure it is worth to talk about 
them. 
 
The first method is to send an open message to the recipient which contains no 
sensitive content but which announces a message waiting for the recipient on 
the sender's secure mail facility. The recipient then follows a link to the sender's 
secure website where the recipient must log in with a username and password 
before being allowed to view the message. 
 
The second one is e-mail jamming, the use of sensitive words in e-mails to jam 
the authorities that listen in on them by providing a form to divert attention away 
and an intentional annoyance. It is used by some civil rights activists in an 
attempt to frustrate government spy networks. Activists deliberately include 
"sensitive" words and sentences in otherwise innocuous emails to ensure that 
these are picked up by the monitoring systems. The theory is that the senders of 
these e-mails will eventually be added to a "harmless" list and their emails no 
longer intercepted, thus allowing them to regain some privacy. 
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7.2 Secure MIME 
 
S/MIME (Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) is a standard for public 
key encryption and signing of e-mail encapsulated in MIME. 
(MIME is an Internet standard that extends the format of e-mail to support text in 
character sets other than ASCII, non-text attachments, message bodies with 
multiple parts and header information in non-ASCII character sets). 
S/MIME provides the following cryptographic security services for electronic 
messaging applications: authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation 
of origin (using digital signatures) and privacy and data security (using 
encryption). S/MIME specifies the application/pkcs7-mime (smime-type 
"enveloped-data") type for data enveloping where the whole MIME entity to be 
enveloped is encrypted and packed into an object which later is inserted into an 
application/pkcs7-mime MIME entity [10]. 
But there are some obstacles to deploying S/MIME in practice: 
 
First of all, not all e-mail software handles S/MIME signatures, resulting in an 
attachment called smime.p7s that may confuse some people.  
 
Also S/MIME is sometimes considered not properly suited for use via webmail 
clients. Though support can be placed into a browser, some security practices 
require the private key to be kept accessible to the user but inaccessible from 
the webmail server, complicating the webmail advantage of providing ubiquitous 
accessibility. This issue is not fully specific to S/MIME - other secure methods of 
signing webmail may also require a browser to execute code to produce the 
signature, exceptions are PGP Desktop and versions of GnuPGP, who will grab 
the data out of the webmail, sign it by means of a clipboard, and put the signed 
data back into the webmail page. Seen from the view of security this is even the 
more secure solution.  
Some organizations consider it acceptable for webmail servers to be "in on the 
secrets"; others don't. 
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S/MIME functionality is built into the majority of modern e-mail software and 
interoperates between them, the most known ones are: 
• Alpine 
• Claws Mail 
• eM client 
• Eudora 
• IBM Lotus Notes 
• Microsoft Office Outlook 
• Mozilla Thunderbird 
• Mutt 
 
7.3 PGP/MIME and OpenPGP 
 
PGP/MIME and OpenPGP are standards based on Pretty Good Privacy. 
 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), created by Philip Zimmermann in 1991, is a data 
encryption and decryption software that provides cryptographic privacy and 
authentication for data communication. PGP is usually used for signing, 
encrypting and decrypting e-mails.  
 
PGP encryption uses a serial combination of hashing, data compression, 
symmetric-key cryptography, and, finally, public-key cryptography. Each step 
uses one of several supported algorithms. Each public key is bound to a user 
name and/or an e-mail address.  
Nowadays, there is no known method which will allow to break PGP encryption 
by cryptographic or computational means. Early versions of PGP have been 
found to have theoretical vulnerabilities and so current versions are 
recommended. In addition to protecting data in transit over a network, PGP 
encryption can also be used to protect data in long-term data storage such as 
disk files. 
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The cryptographic security of PGP encryption depends on the assumption that 
the algorithms used are unbreakable by direct cryptanalysis with current 
equipment and techniques. For instance, in the original version, the RSA 
algorithm was used to encrypt session keys; RSA's security depends upon the 
one-way function nature of mathematical integer factoring. As current versions 
of PGP have added additional encryption algorithms, the degree of their 
cryptographic vulnerability varies with the algorithm used. In practice, each of 
the algorithms in current use is not publicly known to have cryptanalytic 
weaknesses. 
However, PGP is still not suitable for fully transparent e-mail encryption. The 
main missing feature is the lack of MIME integration. Thus, PGP is not suitable 
for multimedia types other than ASCII text. PGP does contain some support for 
8-bit char sets, but at cross-purposes with MIME. Signature checking of non-
ASCII data is simply not reliable. 
These are the main reasons why the PGP standard evolved to PGP/MIME and 
OpenPGP, both supporting MIME standard. 
Some of the clients supporting PGP/MIME or OpenPGP are: 
• Claws Mail 
• Eudora (even though it requires a plugin) 
• Gnus 
• Kmail 
• IBM Lotus Notes 
• Mozilla Thunderbird  
• Mutt 
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7.4 SMPT Over TLS. E-mail Servers Analysis 
 
The protocol adopted to transmit the mail was SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol). The SMTP standard allows the exchange of e-mails from different 
platforms. Historically, this protocol was designed to send short messages, 
without confidentiality in closed networks, and not primarily designed to transmit 
sensitive information through a global network like the Internet. SMTP carries 
messages in a way that anyone can read (clear text). 
Because the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) standard sends e-mail  
without using encryption or authentication, every message you send is exposed 
to view. Client-side solutions such as Secure MIME (S/MIME) or pretty good 
privacy (PGP) can solve this problem, but they require the user involvement. 
Another place to focus the security efforts is on securing SMTP traffic using 
TLS. 
But not all servers support TLS. Use of TLS requires: 
• The purchase of one or more TLS certificates. 
• Configuring the e-mail servers to use them. 
• Additional computational resources on the e-mail servers involved. 
For these reasons, many e-mail servers do not support TLS at all (i.e. most free 
e-mail servers like Gmail and Yahoo! do not). 
We have an available tool online [7] capable to test the receiving e-mail server. 
It makes sure that a receiver will not accept an unprotected e-mail.  While e-mail 
security is mostly the responsibility of the sender, in a high security situation the 
receiver has too a responsibility to make sure the sender meets security 
requirements.  RFC-3207, the Internet standard for TLS e-mail, states “A 
publicly-referenced SMTP server must not require use of TLS in order to deliver 
mail locally” [23].  This implies that security conscious organizations have a 
normal e-mail receiver for normal and a TLS-only receiver for secure e-mail. 
This tool test that a secure e-mail receiver is configured correctly to only receive 
e-mail if the e-mail is sent securely, i.e. with TLS.  It does not accept the 
receiver’s invitation to use TLS, trying to trick the receiver into accepting the e-
mail insecurely.    
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So, what this test is looking for is the e-mail transfer to fail, meaning the receiver 
will not receive e-mail without protection, which indicates a correctly configured 
secure-only receiver. 
We have tested 3 different servers: Gmail, Hotmail and Hushmail. The meanings 
of the columns shown in the result tables are the following: 
 
• Pref: The MX preference for this server. 
• Connect: If this server could be reached from the Internet. 
• Allowed: If this server allows connections. 
• Can Use: If mostly anyone can send mail to users at this site. 
• TLS Advertised: If this server announces it can do TLS. 
• TLS Negotiated: If this server really can do TLS. 
• Sender OK: If this server will accept email from any user. 
• Recipient OK: If this server will accept email to the address you 
entered. 
 
Here are the result we found for Gmail: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Gmail TLS test results (table) 
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As we can see here and in the details above Gmail does not support TLS. (In 
the details we only put the result of one of the MX servers to avoid repetition). 
 
 
 
 
At this point it is worth to comment what EHLO and STARTTLS (will appear in 
later analysis) are. 
 
 
The main identification feature is for ESMTP (Extended SMTP) clients to open a 
transmission with the command EHLO (Extended HELLO), rather than HELO 
(Hello, the original SMTP standard). A server will respond with success (code 
250), failure (code 550) or error (code 500, 501, 502, 504, or 421), depending on 
its configuration. An ESMTP server would return the code 250 OK in a multi-line 
Figure 7.2 – Gmail TLS test results (detail) 
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reply with its domain and a list of keywords to indicate supported extensions. A 
SMTP compliant server would return error code 500, allowing ESMTP clients to 
try either HELO or QUIT. 
 
STARTTLS is a protocol feature commonly found in e-mail protocols, which 
allows TLS and plaintext connections to co-exist on the same port. 
To use STARTTLS a client simply sends STARTTLS to the server. After sending 
this command both client and server switch to TLS mode, based upon the 
plaintext numeric reply generated by the STARTTLS command, and cannot 
switch back to plain text mode. The client must then send an TLS handshake to 
the server and the connection continues in the same manner as one on a 
dedicated TLS port. 
 
 
In the next table we present the result for Hotmail. As Gmail, it neither supports 
TLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 – Hotmail TLS test (table) 
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Finally we decided to create an account in Hushmail to see if what they state in 
their web: “Hushmail is the most secure web-based free email service in the 
world” is true or not. 
 
From the results we can see that all Husmail servers really enable TLS. It seem 
that three of them are failing, but if we look deeper into the details we can see 
this is due to connection timed out and not related to TLS. Therefore we can 
assume the confidence factor is 100 and not 67 as the results state. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 – Hotmail TLS test (details) 
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Figure 7.5 – Hushmail TLS test (table) 
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Figure 7.6 – Hushmail TLS test (details) 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Instant messaging 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
Instant messaging (IM) is a form of real-time direct text-based communication 
between two or more people using personal computers or other devices, along 
with shared software clients.  
 
In the figure below we can see the main protocols used for instant messaging, 
the clients implementing them, and some other useful information such as the 
TLS support. 
 
Later, in the next section we are going to analyze the security of the protocols 
the most used IM clients around the world (AIM, Gtalk, Skype, Windows Live 
Messenger and Yahoo! Messenger) use in order to determine the best one for 
an end user concerned about his security. 
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Figure 8.1 – IM protocols and its features  
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8.2 AOL Instant Messaging (AIM) and ICQ – OSCAR 
Protocol 
 
AOL instant messenger (AIM) is the most widely used service in the instant 
messaging market, with an estimated user base of 53 million people- accounting 
for around 52% of the Instant Messaging market. 
Later America Online also bought to the Israeli company Mirabilis the ICQ 
program, using the same protocol, and reaching more than 100 millions users 
[26]
.  
Since so many individuals use the AIM/ICQ protocol, any kind of weakness 
could affect a very significant number of people. 
 
They use the proprietary OSCAR (Open System for CommunicAtion in 
Realtime) instant messaging protocol, used by most of the clients. However, 
AOL also created a simpler protocol called TOC, with less features, but due to 
its simplicity, much used for clients that only require basic chat functionality. 
The TOC protocol specifications [27] were made available by AOL, while OSCAR 
is a closed protocol that third parties have had to reverse-engineer. 
What was found out is that both protocols send all the data in plain-text, making 
the eavesdropping almost trivial just using an sniffer if you are sharing the same 
LAN. 
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8.3 GTalk - XMPP 
 
Google Talk (GTalk) is a Windows web-based application for instant messaging 
and voice over internet protocol (VOIP), offered by Google Inc.  
Instant messaging between the GTalk servers and its clients uses an open 
protocol, XMPP, allowing users of other XMPP clients also to communicate with 
Google Talk users. VoIP in Google Talk uses an older version of what would 
later become the Jingle protocol (an extension of XMPP). However, the 
technology used within the Google server network is not publicly known. 
But the problem here is that XMPP, even being a standardized protocol, admits 
several ways of implementations (some more secure than others). 
Specifically, the official Google client uses a solution called Google-Token. It 
works like this: 
• The client connects to Google via TLS to 
do the authentication. 
• Google gives a token to the client. 
• The client use that token as authentication 
method. 
 
 
 
Only the connection between the Google Talk client and the Google Talk server 
is encrypted, except when using the web-based version of the client, Gmail's 
chat over HTTP. Hopefully, nowadays the default protocol when you connect the 
Gmail server is https. 
Figure 8.2 – Google client operation 
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Thus messages are not necessarily encrypted end-to-end, although it is possible 
to have end-to-end encryption over the GTalk network using Zfone (software for 
secure voice communication over the Internet) or OTR (off-the-record) chat (a 
cryptographic protocol that provides strong encryption for instant messaging 
conversations using the AES symmetric-key algorithm [28], the Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange [25] and the SHA-1 hash function [29]) when all participants 
connect over HTTPS. Some XMPP clients also natively support encryption with 
Google Talk's servers. 
But if we choose some alternative such as 
Gaim or Pidgin (necessary under Linux), 
thing work in a very different way: 
• The client starts the communication 
with the server XMPP. 
• A TLS tunnel is negotiated. 
• Credentials are sent. 
At that point, all the data travels encrypted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 -  Alternative clients operation 
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8.4 Skype 
 
Skype is a proprietary software application developed by Skype Technologies 
S.A., a corporation that claims to be registered in Luxembourg. The company 
was founded by Janus Friis and Niklas Zennstrom, the same entrepreneurs who 
developed the popular KaZaA file trading system.  It allows users to make voice 
calls over the Internet. Skype has also become popular for its additional features 
which include instant messaging, file transfer, and video conferencing. 
 
Like KaZaA, Skype is based on peer-to-peer technology: instead transmitting all 
voice calls through a central server, Skype users search for other users to 
connect to, enabling them to search other Skype users and send them 
messages. 
 
 
 
 
Although it uses peer-to-peer communications for locating other Skype users 
and for transmitting voice communications, Skype relies on a central 
authentication server to authenticate users and software distributions.  
Figure 8.4 – Skype Network 
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The Skype protocol is not public, but numerous attempts to study and reverse 
engineer it have been undertaken to reveal the protocol, investigate security or 
to allow unofficial clients. 
 
It makes wide use of cryptography to authenticate user and server identities, 
and to protect the content transmitted across the P2P.  
It uses only standard cryptographic primitives (well-established, low-level 
cryptographic algorithms) to reach its objectives. These primitives include the 
AES block cipher, the RSA public-key cryptosystem, the ISO 9796-2 signature 
padding scheme, the SHA-1 hash function, and the RC4 stream cipher [12]. 
Skype operates a certificate authority for user names and authorizations. Digital 
signatures created by this authority are the basis for identity in Skype. Skype 
nodes entering into a session correctly verify the identity of their peer. It is 
infeasible for an attacker to spoof a Skype identity at or below the session layer. 
 
Skype uses a proprietary session-establishment protocol. The cryptographic 
purposes of this protocol are to protect against replay (a form of network attack 
in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or 
delayed), to verify peer identity, and to allow the communicating peers to agree 
on a secret session key. The communicating peers then use their session key to 
have a confidential communication during the lifetime of the session. 
Skype stores registration information both on the caller's computer and on a 
Skype server. Skype uses this information to authenticate call recipients and to 
assure that callers seeking authentication are accessing a Skype server rather 
than an impostor. Skype uses RSA public key encryption to accomplish this. 
The Skype server has a private key, and distributes that key's public counterpart 
with every copy of the software. As part of user registration, the user selects a 
desired username and password. Skype locally generates public and private 
keys. The private key and a hash of the password are stored as securely as 
possible on the user's computer. 
The Skype server verifies that the selected username is unique and that follows 
Skype's naming rules. The server stores the username and a hash of the hash 
of the user's password [H(H(P))] in its database. 
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The server now forms and signs an identity certificate for the username that 
binds the username, its verification key and the key identifier. 
Then, for each call, Skype uses 256 bit AES encryption to encrypt 
communication between users, making difficult the decryption of these 
communications. Skype's encryption is inherent in the Skype Protocol and is 
transparent to the users. The client creates a session key using its random 
number generator. 
In conclusion, the designers of Skype did not hesitate to employ cryptography 
widely and well in order to establish a foundation of trust, authenticity, and 
confidentiality for their peer-to-peer services. The implementers of Skype 
implemented the cryptographic functions correctly and efficiently. As a result, the 
confidentiality of a Skype session is far greater than that offered by a wired or 
wireless telephone call or by email and email attachments. 
 
However, it should be possible for even unprivileged participants of the network 
to perform traffic analysis and determine when one user calls another user. It is 
unknown if the design of the Skype network makes it possible for some nodes to 
monitor all searches and call set-up traffic, or if instead each node would only 
see a portion of the overall traffic. 
 
Finally, we have to remember that the security of the Skype system also 
depends entirely on the good will of Skype’s programmers and the organization 
running Skype’s back-end servers. It is possible that there are back doors in the 
system allowing the Skype organization or others to eavesdrop or record Skype 
conversations. 
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8.5 Windows Live Messenger – Microsoft Notification 
Protocol 
 
 
Windows Live Messenger is an instant messaging client created by Microsoft 
that is currently designed to work with Windows. 
Windows Live Messenger uses the Microsoft Notification Protocol (MSNP) over 
TCP (and optionally over HTTP to deal with proxies) to connect to the .NET 
Messenger Service. 
The protocol is not completely secret; Microsoft disclosed version 2 (MSNP2) to 
developers in 1999, but never released versions 8 or higher to the public. The 
.NET Messenger Service servers currently only accept protocol versions from 8 
and higher, so the syntax of new commands sent from versions 8 and higher is 
only known by using packet sniffers like Wireshark. 
This has been an easy task because, in comparison to many other modern 
instant messaging protocols like XMPP, the Microsoft Notification Protocol does 
not provide any encryption and everything can be captured easily using packet 
sniffers. Actually the latest versions include TLS, but only for authentication. 
This lack of proper encryption also makes wiretapping friend lists and personal 
conversations a trivial task, especially in unencrypted public Wi-Fi networks. 
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8.6 Yahoo! Messenger 
 
 
Yahoo! Messenger (YMSG) is an instant messaging client and its associated 
protocol provided by Yahoo!. 
The login process for YMSG is quite complex. First of all, the client introduces 
itself with a message containing its username. Then the server responds with a 
rather long seed value. Finally, the client put this into an algorithm, along with 
the account's password, to produce two response values looking like variable 
assignments which are sent to the server. If these values match the server's 
expectations, the client is admitted and sent data associated with that account 
(such as friend lists). 
Originally the YMSG login procedure suffered from a security flaw known as a 
replay attack, in which a given password (or other authentication information) is 
always identically scrambled when sent across the network. This allows any 
attacker who witnesses the transmission to merely reproduce the message in 
order to successfully log in, without actually needing to know the original 
password (or other details) which generated it. But some years ago Yahoo! 
upgraded its service to introduce a random element to each login attempt, 
defeating any further potential for replay attacks. 
With the exception of the login authentication details, data sent over a YMSG 
connection is not encrypted. YMSG uses a binary format in which the text 
portions of the data are transmitted in plain view. Hence, while it is difficult for an 
attacker to seize control of a Yahoo! IM account, it is quite easy for them to read 
all messages sent to and from the account holder, along with other details such 
as the list of friends, if the attacker has control of one of the computers through 
which the data is routed. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
During this master thesis we have presented several ways to avoid Internet data 
eavesdropping.  
 
We started trying out an alternative way to encryption, source routing. Source 
routing basis is heading our data throw the routers we know are secures (since 
the initial scope of this thesis was avoiding the interception by foreign 
governments, so we assumed national networks were secure). 
 
After developing a way to find a way to identify the possible compromised 
routers, we bumped into some security problem associated to source routing 
that lead Internet providers to disable this option. 
 
After that we decided to continue with the encryption option studying the most 
common secure protocols used over the Internet (TLS, SSH and IPsec) in 
combination with a tool to avoid traffic analysis, and then we studied how they 
are implemented in the most common software clients used for web browsing, e-
mailing or instant messaging. 
 
After this study we can conclude that the best option for end-users to secure 
their Internet communication is using software (browsers, e-mail clients, etc) 
implementing TLS encryption. We think this option is much better than IPsec 
because users don’t have to worry about installing extra software.  
 
We also encourage to use TOR as a way to avoid traffic analysis. It is really 
simple to use, just install it and it will work in background without any problem. 
This combined with TLS is great to fight against eavesdropping. 
 
As we have seen in our little experiment, most of the common web browsers like 
Firefox are ready to negotiate a TLS connexion with the server.  
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We only recommend employing SSH for its primary use, a substitute of Telnet to 
do remote login in other computers.  
 
As we have seen, TLS encryption is not an option for most of e-mail providers, 
and they can only protect the information intermittently from intrusion. 
Because of that we think that using one of the e-mail clients described above is 
the best and simple option when talking about e-mail. 
 
When talking about Instant Messaging, we do the same recommendation. Once 
you know which available clients are secure the best option is to use them. 
As we have seen, Skype is much secure than the others, even though it can 
have backdoors. In most cases the security Skype provides will be enough, but 
when dealing with very sensitive data we strongly recommend running our IM 
client over a virtual private network. 
 
Finally, we have to say that the cost of being protected is null, because we 
always have free software available for it (like most of the web browsers and IM 
clients). If we need some other encryption programs such as PGP (now part of 
Symantec) we also have the open source option for free (OpenPGP). 
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